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Abstract 
 
The birth certificate is a document used by a 
person to obtain identification and licensing 
documents throughout their lifetime.  For identity 
verification, the birth certificate provides limited 
information to support a person’s claim of identity.  
Authentication to the birth certificate is strictly a 
matter of possession.  DNA profiling is becoming a 
commodity analysis that can be done accurately in 
under two hours with little human intervention.  The 
DNA profile is a superior biometric to add to a birth 
record because it is stable throughout a person’s life 
and beyond.  Acceptability of universal DNA profiling 
will depend heavily on privacy and safety concerns.  
This paper uses the U.S. FBI CODIS profile as a basis 
to discuss the effectiveness of DNA profiling and to 
provide a practical basis for a discussion of potential 
privacy and authenticity controls.  As is discussed, 
adopting DNA profiles to improve document security 
should be done cautiously. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A birth certificate is a document that enables a 
person to obtain genuine identification and licensing 
documentation years after birth. The birth certificate is 
referred to as a breeder document.  The birth certificate 
provides limited information to an identity verifier. 
The birth certificate, as means for identity 
authentication, is less reliable than identification and 
licensing documents obtained later in life, such as a 
driver’s license or passport.  Unlike the passport or 
driver’s license, historically the birth certificate has 
been a static document, meaning its contents are never 
renewed or refreshed.  
Recently a birth certificate or certificate of live 
birth has been implemented as an electronic record [4] 
when submitted to an appropriate jurisdictional vital 
records agency by one of approximately 6,400 entities 
that are authorized birth certificate issuers in the 
United States [10].  The electronic record contains 
public health related fields that are not commonly seen 
on the document typically associated with the term 
“birth certificate.”  A second document titled “Birth 
Certificate” or “Certificate of Live Birth” is what 
individuals typically consider the document of their 
birth. This second birth document is issued to 
individuals by a vital records agency, and primarily 
contains information including a child’s name, birth 
date, birthplace, gender and parent information.  
Possession of the birth certificate is the dominant 
means of proving the identity on the certificate is that 
of the person presenting it or of a minor a guardian is 
assisting.  The existence of two related documents 
produced by different issuers and for different 
purposes may be confusing.  For purposes of clarity, 
the documentation submitted to the vital records 
agencies will be referred to as the certificate of live 
birth (CLB).  The document issued by vital records 
agencies to individuals for identification purposes will 
be referred to as the birth certificate (BC).  
Historically, hospitals and midwives issued BCs to 
family members, but today in many cases, government 
entities are the legitimate issuers. 
Biometrics within passports and identity 
documents has been incorporated [2].  The report titled 
“Birth Certificate Fraud” issued in 2000 by the Office 
of Inspector General of the U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Services suggests that biometrics be considered 
for incorporation in birth certificates [10].  The lack of 
progress on that front may be an issue of cost and 
technical capabilities.  Another issue to consider is the 
change a person undergoes from birth to adulthood.  
There are few biometric identifiers that remain stable 
from birth to death.  The DNA profile is the only 
biometric that remains stable from birth to death and 
beyond.  The dead have been identified by tissue 
samples of an otherwise unrecognizable person or body 
part.  Having the DNA profile established at birth 
allows for a person’s life to have a definitive beginning 
for purposes of documentation and record keeping. 
DNA analysis has become commonplace.  It is 
being used for food safety and food counterfeiting 
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surveillance [23].  DNA analysis is being used for 
defecation attribution [18].  The web site ancestry.com 
is offering DNA analysis for $89 and has tested more 
than 1.5 million people [6].  DNA analysis is quickly 
approaching commodity status.  The FBI has approved 
a Rapid DNA Index System that will produce a 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) acceptable 
DNA profile within one to two hours from sample 
intake to result and requires no human intervention [7].  
To date, the Rapid DNA system has not been approved 
for CODIS profile submission when operated from 
within a law enforcement booking station or agency. 
However, this federal program’s technical achievement 
is an indication that DNA analysis can eventually be 
performed outside specialized laboratories.   
This paper is an exploration of the potential 
convergence of DNA analysis, birth records 
management and identification document security.  
This convergence promises to increase document 
security significantly.  The polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) short tandem repeat (STR) DNA profiling has 
the potential to reliably link individuals to their birth 
records at time of birth and provide a reliable means of 
identity authentication many years later.  This 
improved security, however, complicates birth 
certificate issuance and maintenance for years to come.  
Acceptability of universal DNA profiling will be 
contingent upon safeguards to protect personal privacy 
and safety.  This paper raises some of the requirements 
that need to be considered and discusses the challenges 
they bring.  Document security is a multi-level 
problem.  The instance of the document must exhibit 
various integrity and authenticity properties.  The 
system by which documents are issued and managed 
also requires careful consideration.  This paper focuses 
on the individual birth record as opposed to document 
management systems. 
This paper explores past efforts related to this 
topic and how DNA profiling could work in 
conjunction with document security, and closes with a 
discussion. 
2. Past efforts 
Numerous biometrics have been introduced to 
address a number of identification and security 
problems.  Reliable individual recognition is critical to 
many processes that require accurate authorization and 
accountability.  Biometric authentication has been 
automated to verify or recognize the identity of a living 
person based on a physiological or behavioral 
characteristic [16, 17, 24, 25].  A few better known 
physiological and behavioral characteristics currently 
used for automatic identification include DNA, 
fingerprints, voice, iris, retina, hand, face, handwriting, 
keystroke, finger shape, as well as new measures, such 
as gait, ear shape, head resonance, optical skin 
reflectance and body odor. The ideal biometric 
characteristic has five qualities: robustness, 
distinctiveness, availability, accessibility and 
acceptability. The biometric should be: 1) unchanging 
on an individual over time (“robust”); 2) showing great 
variation over the population (“distinctive”); 3) that 
members of the population should have multiple 
instances of this measure (“available”); 4) ability to 
image or capture the measure’s qualities using 
electronic sensors (“accessible”); 5) that people do not 
object to having this measurement taken of them 
(“acceptability”) [16, 17, 19, 24].  Many uses of 
biometrics have focused on IT systems and facilities 
security [16, 17].  Performance based biometrics, such 
as keystroke or gait, are unrealistic as a means to 
authenticate an identity document given variety of 
physical environments in which identity documents are 
verified.  The performance characteristics of an infant 
are a poor indicator of how that person in adulthood 
will perform (e.g. typing, walking).  Fingerprints may 
be the most compelling option available today, but 
their size undergoes significant change from infancy to 
adulthood [3]. 
Methods to embed DNA information in identity 
documents have been proposed. Fuson applied for 
patents that document methods for including DNA on a 
birth certificate by either embedding an actual DNA 
sample or incorporating a chip containing DNA data 
[11, 12]. Other researchers have developed a printable 
ink that contains DNA for identification [15, 
21]. These approaches, however, are potentially more 
costly and cumbersome than the technique presented 
here, which encodes and transforms CODIS loci 
information into a numerical value to be placed on the 
tangible certificate as well as in the online vital records 
entry. The transformation proposed in this article 
considers the privacy risk of capturing DNA 
information, which these past efforts do not adequately 
address.  In terms of the efficiency of using DNA as a 
biometric, researchers at National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), are making 
progress on reducing the processing time for PCR-
based STR markers [22]. 
3. Genetics primer 
Within the nucleus of each human cell are 23 pairs 
of chromosomes.  The mother contributes one 
chromosome to each pair and the other is from the 
father.  Each chromosome is composed of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).  DNA is a double helix 
structure that is designed to split into two strands 
during cell division.  The two strands are joined 
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together by specialized chemical bonds between two 
organic compounds.  This bonded pair of compounds 
is called a base pair.  There are four distinct types of 
base compounds. (A - adenine, T – thymine, G – 
guanine, C – cytosine).  Although the two strands are 
chemically different they are complementary in terms 
of information.  This quality is derived by the special 
nature of the bond between adenine and thymine and 
the bond between guanine and cytosine.  The catalog 
of base pairs is limited to A-T, T-A, G-C and C-G.  
This means a single strand of DNA dictates the 
composition of the double helix because the second 
strand must be composed of base compounds that will 
bond.  This pairing behavior is exploited in DNA 
profiling. 
The estimated number of base pairs among the 23 
chromosome pairs is three billion [1].  Sequences of 
base pairs function collectively to act as a gene.  A 
gene defines the chemical composition of proteins and 
other organic compounds necessary for life.  Not all of 
the 3 billion base pairs appear to have an active part in 
cellular biology.  Genes and non-functional sequences 
of base pairs are located on the same chromosome and 
same starting point along the double helix.  Genes and 
non-functional sequences come in pairs, and are 
located at the same location of the same chromosome 
contributed by the mother and the chromosome 
provided by the father.  The base compound 
composition within these genes and non-functional 
sequences can vary between maternal and paternal 
chromosomes.  An allele is a specific base compound 
sequence of a gene or non-functional region.  The term 
genotype commonly refers to a pair of alleles where 
each allele exists at the same specific location or locus 
on the maternal and paternal chromosome within a 
chromosome pair.   
One composition dynamic within DNA is the 
presence of STRs.  STRs are repetitions of short 
adjacent sequences consisting of base compounds, 
such as TATA or GTAGTA along a single DNA 
strand.  The quantity of these tandem or adjacent 
compound sequence repetitions defines the length of 
the allele.  For example, the allele designations for 
D3S1358 shown in Table 1 signify length as the 
number of times a particular expected base 
combination sequence (i.e. AGAT or TCTA depending 
on strand [9] ) repeats starting at the locus D3S1358.  
An allele designated as 15 is one where 15 repetitions 
of the expected base sequence occurred. An allele with 
a decimal point value indicates the degree of 
completion of the expected sequence within the last 
repetition.  A locus designator (e.g. D3S1358) starting 
with D indicates the chromosome (e.g. chromosome 3) 
and identifies a unique DNA segment (e.g. 1358) along 
the chromosome.  The other locus label conventions 
seen in Table 1 follow historical naming that requires a 
reference lookup to determine the actual location. 
Although each chromosome pair consists of a 
contribution from the mother and father, the 
chromosome’s contributor cannot be attributed by 
general characteristics such as length, orientation, 
color, location, weight or shape. A reference 
chromosome from the mother or father is needed for 
partial sequencing and compared to the partial 
sequencing of the offspring’s chromosome in order to 
attribute origin.  This is done in paternity cases, which 
is not the purpose of the CODIS.  In the criminal DNA 
forensics context, attributing the parental origin of each 
of the 46 chromosomes appears to be unnecessary [20].  
Genotype notation is not an ordered list.  The genotype 
for D3S1358 of allele of 15, 16 is equivalent to 16, 15.  
The parental origin of the particular DNA strand 
containing the allele of 15 at D3S1358 is not 
determined.  During the PCR analysis process, DNA 
strands are snipped apart bio-chemically and the 
process does not maintain the information of which 
pair member contributed to which snippet.  This 
property is utilized in the discussion regarding privacy. 
4. Document security 
When attempting to improve the reliability of 
linkage between a person and their identity 
documentation, the challenge is not identification 
(seeking to know who an individual is from a 
population), but a challenge of authentication or 
verification (is the claimant truly the person identified 
by document).   Authentication requires that a person 
be enrolled in order to initialize the identity and submit 
a means by which this person will support their claim 
of identity in the future.   
Biometrics, in the context of identity documents, 
have usage dynamics that are different from systems 
security.  The CLB is issued by a loosely coordinated 
group of issuers, and the verifiers of identity are 
unlikely to be those who issued the BC.  For example, 
a baby born in New York City (NYC) will have a birth 
certificate issued by the NYC Department of Health, 
and a verifier could be the Nebraska Department of 
Motor Vehicles.  The international dimension of 
issuance and verification raises complexity even 
further.  Decentralized issuance and uncoordinated 
verification lead to dynamics unlike those experienced 
within a closed system.   
The identity document issuer and verifier are 
concerned about the document’s accuracy, authenticity 
and integrity.  The verifier needs a means to 
authenticate the document’s legitimacy as well as the 
claimant-to-document relationship.  Birth records 
without biometrics have fewer privacy implications for 
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the individual being identified.  Affixing valuable 
immutable data such as DNA sequencing raises the 
privacy risk a person experiences.  The next sections 
explore how DNA can be utilized for authentication, 
propose a means to achieve privacy and suggest a 
means to maintain authenticity and integrity. 
4.1. Individual authentication 
When considering the use of DNA to provide 
authentication, the question being asked is “How can 
DNA analysis be used to ensure the person claiming a 
birth certificate is theirs is being honest?”  Underlying 
this question are questions related to the process of 
DNA analysis, process reliability, results interpretation 
and the chances and types of error.   
DNA use in forensics has primarily been used to 
aid the justice system in criminal and civil cases.  The 
notion of relating evidence (ex. blood sample, child 
with disputed paternity) with individuals is 
conceptually similar to relating a documented DNA 
profile bound to an identity document to the person 
who claims to be represented by that document.  DNA 
forensics analysis involves one or both of two 
dominant methods.  The two processes are the variable 
numbers of tandem repeats (VNTR) process and the 
PCR process.  The PCR process depends on STRs and 
is agile in terms of method acceleration and is highly 
precise in its results.  Disadvantages related to PCR-
based STR methods are that the individuating power 
per locus is lower and contamination during the 
process has an exaggerated effect.  The FBI uses the 
PCR-based STR process to populate CODIS, which is 
a collection of DNA profiles used in law enforcement.  
As of January 2017, the system will use 20 core STR 
loci, which is seven more loci than in DNA profiles 
that exist prior to this date [14].   
In order for CODIS to be successful as a law 
enforcement and prosecutorial tool, the scientific basis 
of the PCR-based STR profile utilized has undergone 
significant review in the areas of genetics, reliability, 
repeatability, population genetics and statistics. 
Adoption of CODIS profiles as the basis for DNA 
authentication of birth certificates is a reasonable 
choice.  Although the newest CODIS profile of 20 STR 
loci has not been instituted operationally, it is formally 
adopted.  As long as the sample contains cells from 
one DNA contributor, the PCR-based STR process 
produces an unambiguous profile.  However, there 
remains the question of whether a fraudulent claimant 
will be able to successfully authenticate (false positive) 
or whether the proper claimant could be unsuccessful 
in proving his/her claim (false negative). 
In order to make these concepts more tangible, a 
scenario of a fictional person called Jo is explored.  Jo 
is gender neutral.  The core CODIS loci are autosomes, 
meaning the loci are not located on the X-Y gender 
chromosomes.  Table 1 shows Jo’s CODIS DNA 
profile. 
 
Table 1: Jo’s CODIS DNA profile - compiled by 
drawing from allele types and frequencies 
published in the “Caucasian 2015 Expanded 
FBI STR Loci Allele Frequencies” [8].   
Locus Genotype  Allele Frequencies 
D3S1358 15, 16  0.2475, 0.2327 
vWA 17, 18 0.2673, 0.2178 
D16S539 12, 11 0.3416, 0.2723 
CSF1PO 12, 11 0.3267, 0.2995 
TPOX 8, 11 0.5470, 0.2550 
D8S1179 13, 14 0.3342, 0.2054 
D21S11 30, 29 0.2327, 0.1807 
D18S51 14, 17 0.1757, 0.1535 
D2S441 11, 14 0.3094, 0.2624 
D19S433 14, 13 0.3490, 0.2797 
TH01 9.3, 6 0.3045, 0.2252 
FGA 22, 21 0.1881, 0.1757 
D22S1045 15, 16 0.3639, 0.3168 
D5S818 11, 12 0.4084, 0.3515 
D13S317 11, 12 0.3119, 0.3094 
D7S820 10, 11 0.2896, 0.2030 
D10S1248 13, 14  0.3366, 0.2748 
D1S1656 17.3, 15 0.1510, 0.1436 
D12S391 18, 21 0.1757, 0.1337 
D2S1338 17, 19 0.1931, 0.1510 
 
Jo is as “common” as a Caucasian person can be 
with the CODIS profile.  Jo’s profile shows the 
discriminating power of the CODIS scheme by 
assembling a profile consisting of the two most 
common alleles for each locus.  At first glance it is 
apparent that even the most common alleles for some 
loci are not so common (ex. D18S51, D12S391).  Jo is 
the offspring of parents who happen to contribute the 
most common alleles of each locus for Caucasians 
within the sample used to produce the FBI reference 
statistics table for Caucasians.  A somewhat unusual 
characteristic of this profile is that all genotypes are 
heterozygous (the alleles contributed by the parents are 
different).  It would be reasonable to see at least one 
genotype that is homozygous (the same allele 
contributed by both parents).  These genotype 
distinctions influence the statistical calculations.  As 
will be shown, homozygous genotype occurrence at a 
locus is less frequent within a population and therefore 
makes a profile more distinctive and less common. 
According to the National Research Council 
(NRC) report [1] recommendations adopted by the FBI 
in the FBI Quality Assurance Standards document [5], 
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the following are the common computations related to 
DNA profiles. 
 
Random-Match Probabilities: 
Equation 1.A: 𝑝! + 𝑝 1 − 𝑝 𝜃 (homozygous) 
Equation 1.B: 2𝑝!𝑝!  (heterozygotes) 
   
The letter p represents probability of an allele 
occurring within a population, which the FBI are 
calling frequency in their tables.  The expression that 
follows the squaring of p in equation 1.A is a 
correction factor to adjust for the underlying 
assumptions of a random mating population.  Reality is 
that females and males do not routinely seek mates 
from random places (e.g. mother from Maine and 
father from Oklahoma) within the U.S.  Convenience is 
a likely factor in most pairings and location and 
demographic factors influence just how random 
genotypes will be.  There is a strong correlation of 
homozygosity and the degree of familial relation 
between mates, and isolated communities are likely to 
have individuals with a higher degree of homozygosity 
than what would occur if truly random mating were to 
occur.  Population groupings like Caucasian, African 
American, and American Indian influence the 
frequencies of occurrence of alleles within genotypes 
and proper statistical calculations require that the 
population group of the individual from which a profile 
originates be considered.  The θ is a constant that 
addresses the degree of isolation of the community 
from which an individual originates.  The θ value is 
recommended by the NRC to range from 0.01 to 0.03 
of which 0.03 is considered highly conservative from a 
false positive point of view.  This is due to θ increasing 
the probability of occurrence of a genotype, which in 
turn suggests the genotype is less discriminating in a 
particular circumstance. 
Equation 1.B is fairly straightforward.  The reason 
for the doubling of the result is that the allele 
frequency is independent of whether the allele source 
was the mother or father.  There are two opportunities 
for the genotype to occur.  The subscripts i and j refer 
to a specific allele of a locus.  Because 1.B is for 
heterozygote genotypes, the alleles are not the same 
and therefore i and j cannot be equal.   Applying 1.B  
to Jo’s profile and for the particular locus vWA, the 
equation would be written as 2𝑝!"𝑝!" = 2 ∗ 0.2676 ∗0.2178 = 0.1152. 
Equations 1.A and 1.B compute the probability 
that a particular genotype occurs at a specific locus.  
The statistical theory supporting this and other 
computations depend on the loci being gender neutral 
and not subject to natural selection. 
A DNA profile consists of multiple loci, and the 
discriminating power of the profile results from being 
able to combine the probabilities or frequencies of the 
observed genotypes to determine the uniqueness of the 
overall profile.  The product rule is the recommended 
calculation of profile frequency [1].  This calculation 
depends on the notion of linkage equilibrium among 
the loci, which is the population genetics concept that 
over time generations within populations will mate in 
such a way the genotypes that occur in selection 
neutral locations will occur independent of each other, 
which allows us to treat the loci as independent random 
variables necessary for the product rule to be valid.  
Therefore a DNA profile’s frequency can be 
determined by applying 1.A or 1.B to each observed 
genotype depending on its homozygosity and 
multiplying each genotype probability result together 
using the product rule.  
In the case of Jo, the profile frequency is 8.0493 x 
10-19.  This value is the match probability, which 
measures the probability of this profile being presented 
by someone else (i.e. false positive).  These other 
possible people are assumed to be random people 
within the population, but not relatives. The most 
challenging source of false positives is Jo’s relatives.  
An identical twin is able to successfully authenticate. 
Existence of identical twins should be documented on 
the birth certificate, and other authentication controls 
will be needed for that situation.  Jo’s parents, 
uncles/aunts, nieces/nephews have match probabilities 
relative to Jo’s profile that are significantly higher.  
The match probability of a parent, uncle/aunt, first 
cousin matching Jo’s COIDS profile, consisting of the 
two most common alleles for each locus, are 0.1351 (a 
conservative estimate), 0.0336, 0.0161 respectively.  A 
distant unilineal relative of Jo’s has a match probability 
of at least 0.0074.  The formulae used for these match 
probability calculations can be found in the NRC 
report [1].   
The birthing facility would be the appropriate 
party to perform DNA profile enrollment.  They have 
physical possession of the infant and often have 
witnessed the child’s birth. They also have the 
medically trained staff to obtain and process a DNA 
sample, which in time should require little laboratory 
training.  Infants born at home or in non-institutional 
settings would need to be brought into an authorized 
facility for a medical exam and formal birth 
registration. The resulting DNA profile would be 
translated into a data structure that addresses integrity, 
authenticity and privacy requirements prior to CLB 
submission to the vital records agency.  The CLB 
issuer should be the entity that provides assurances of 
the DNA profile’s authenticity, because they 
performed the DNA profile enrollment.  The BC issuer 
assures authenticity over the entire BC, but the CLB 
issuer performed the enrolling DNA profile protocol. 
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4.2. Privacy 
In this discussion of privacy protection the most 
significant assumption being made is that the DNA 
profile be composed of PCR-based STRs or be 
performed with a profiling protocol that characterizes a 
person’s alleles with equal or better precision and 
reliability. 
With recorded lifespans occasionally exceeding 
120 years, a solution involving DNA privacy should 
target at least 150 years of protection.  Privacy 
protections would need to protect a person’s privacy 
from the first minutes after birth when the birth is 
documented to their death.  Individuals are born nearly 
every second of every day.  The privacy time clock is 
reset for each of these births.  A birth record 
management system will need to institute new 
protections regularly in order to provide 150 years of 
privacy protection for each subsequent newborn.  A 
privacy concern is that genetic relatives are a threat to 
each other in terms of DNA privacy.  An older birth 
record for a grandparent may be a privacy concern for 
their grandchildren. Having the DNA profile directly 
readable on the birth certificate raises significant 
privacy concerns. 
Although the PCR STR loci are chosen to be 
ideally non-functioning regions within chromosomes, 
some loci are related to genes.  Often loci are selected 
from regions of chromosomes that are not relevant 
genetically to diseases or subject to natural selection 
[1, 13].   
Using the FBI profiling schema should avoid 
medically sensitive portions of the DNA.  This is a 
positive privacy accommodation that reduces medical 
privacy threats to the profile data.  However, the 
immutable nature of DNA and the similarity among 
relatives raises the concern that the profile in 
unscrupulous hands would be used maliciously against 
the individual or a family member or an entity trusting 
the validity of the DNA authentication process.  
Although statistics are required to determine the 
significance of a match, statistics and judgment are not 
used to determine the profile and evaluate whether a 
match has occurred.  The precision of the PCR-based 
STR process allows for exact determination of the 
genotype at each locus each time it is properly utilized.  
Unlike other biometrics, DNA profile determination is 
consistent and controlled.  The final results are highly 
repeatable, and therefore the match determination is a 
simple logical evaluation.  The authentication 
evaluation is, “Do both the documented profile and 
provided profile contain the same genotype at each 
loci?”  A PCR-based STR profile match is accepted or 
rejected based on complete agreement between two 
profiles.  The DNA profile is an immutable and innate 
passphrase every person possesses.   
A requirement for privacy protections is that they 
can complicate but must not prevent effective 
authentication and authenticity verification.  In order to 
provide privacy for this “bio-phrase,” one can take a 
page from the history of passphrase protection.  One 
can construct a DNA profile and encode it into a 
structured profile data unit (PDU), and perform one-
way cryptographic transformations on that PDU that 
produces a unique result.  These transformations limit 
the ability to restore and determine the contents of the 
original PDU, which contains the DNA profile, while 
preserving the distinctiveness of the DNA profile.  
Cryptographic hash functions like SHA-2 or SHA-3 
are algorithms that suffice today.  By avoiding a 
reversible process, such as encryption, there is no need 
to rely on secrecy of decryption keys to maintain 
privacy protection.  However, another page in 
passphrase history is the offline attack on passphrases.  
The equivalent attack would be for an attacker to gain 
access to a birth record and attempt to determine the 
DNA profile by postulating numerous, possibly 
millions, DNA profiles and transforming them until an 
attacker’s attempts result in a match.  
Returning to Jo’s profile, a simple concatenation 
of the genotypes would allow us to construct a bio-
phrase without losing profile information.  Prior to 
applying cryptographic algorithms the genotype data 
would undergo simple pre-processing.  First step is to 
sort the locus allele pairs to force consistency of 
placement of allele values within the PDU.  Next is to 
normalize them into three digit integers by multiplying 
each allele value by 10.   Each result under 100 would 
have a zero prepended.  This process avoids parsing 
ambiguity within the PDU contents.  Finally, 
concatenating the normalized allele values to from 
genotype sub-strings.  Table 2 shows results of the 
encoding steps in context of Jo’s DNA profile.  There 
is an opportunity to improve privacy by randomly 
concatenating the genotype sub-strings when forming 
the PDU.  The order of loci provided in Table 1 is not 
significant to the interpretation of the DNA profile.  By 
randomly ordering the profile loci, 20! possible 
genotype sub-string orderings are introduced.  Pre-
computation attacks, such as rainbow tables, will be 
more difficult to execute.  The order of the genotypes 
would be documented and accessible to the verifier in 
order to assemble the genotype sub-strings into the 
correct order during verification. 
It is reasonable to anticipate that different DNA 
profiling protocols will be introduced over time and 
ambiguity regarding the protocol must be avoided 
when verifying an individual’s BC.  The DNA profile 
protocol identifier, loci order pattern and CLB record 
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identifier would be among the accessible fields of the 
BC in order for a verifier to reproduce the PDU 
generated during enrollment.  The genotype ordering 
pattern metadata, CLB record identifier, DNA profiling 
protocol identifier would also be incorporated as part 
of the PDU thus ensuring the loci pattern, correct CLB 
record and profiling process are used or referenced 
during verification.  The PDU is hashed using a 
cryptographic hash function.  The result is submitted 
along with other CLB fields to the appropriate vital 
records agency. 
 
 
Table 2: Encoding of Jo’s profile 
 
Profile 
Result 
Sorted  
Long  Short 
Genotype 
Sub-string 
D3S1358 15 16 16 15 160150 
vWA 17 18 18 17 180170 
D16S539 12 11 12 11 120110 
CSF1PO 12 11 12 11 120110 
TPOX 8 11 11 8 110080 
D8S1179 13 14 14 13 140130 
D21S11 30 29 30 29 300290 
D18S51 14 17 17 14 170140 
D2S441 11 14 14 11 140110 
D19S433 14 13 14 13 140130 
TH01 9.3 6 9.3 6 093060 
FGA 22 21 22 21 220210 
D22S1045 15 16 16 15 160150 
D5S818 11 12 12 11 120110 
D13S317 11 12 12 11 120110 
D7S820 10 11 11 10 110100 
D10S1248 13 14 14 13 140130 
D1S1656 17.3 15 17.3 15 173150 
D12S391 18 21 21 18 210180 
D2S1338 17 19 19 17 190170 
 
 
4.3. Integrity and authenticity 
Integrity and authenticity of document content can 
be assured through specialized documentation 
materials and printing processes used to issue a BC.  
Integrity and authenticity of the electronic CLB will 
require digital security controls.  Similar digital data 
security controls will prove useful for digital data 
stored on the BC.  The integrity of all of the various 
CLB fields including the DNA profile (contained 
within the protected PDU) and supporting profile fields 
must be verifiable as an ensemble within the CLB and 
BC.  Performing a cryptographic checksum 
incorporating all of the birth record (CLB or BC) data 
fields can enable record integrity verification.  
However, the cryptographic checksum could be 
substituted with a new value that incorporates 
fraudulent changes.  To prevent substitution of the 
checksum, data authenticity services are required.  The 
CLB issuer will authenticate the protected PDU as well 
as authenticate the overall CLB.  The distinct 
authentication on the protected PDU is necessary for 
BC content validation. 
Anticipating coordination among CLB submitting 
institutions, vital records agencies and BC validators is 
not practical.  Therefore, authenticating BC content 
cannot be dependent upon shared secrets.  Digital 
signatures can provide the authenticity services needed.  
This will complicate BCs further, because the public-
key certificates of both the CLB submitter and the vital 
records agency must be accessible to the verifier in 
order to validate the digital signatures covering BC 
content.   
The introduction of public-key certificates leads 
directly to the requirement of a public key 
infrastructure.  Public-key certificates need to be issued 
by an entity each validator can trust.  There are more 
than 6,400 authorized CLB submitters in the U.S. and 
those organizations that grant CLB submission 
authorization would be the natural parties to issue the 
CLB submitter’s public-key certificate.  For these 
purposes, the BC validator would be better served by a 
flat certificate authority hierarchy thus improving the 
BC’s ability to be self-contained.  A validating 
apparatus could be configured with a managed 
repository of trusted public-key certificates for each 
certificate authority that may have signed the CLB 
submitter and BC issuer public-key certificates.   
Adding DNA profile information and related 
information will increase the amount of accessible 
information significantly.  Digital signatures would 
complement printed seals, and will be easier for a 
verification apparatus to accurately authenticate.  A 
contactless storage device integrated into the certificate 
material should store all BC fields and any additional 
information not visible on the BC.  Printing protected 
PDU information on the BC should be considered 
carefully.  Visual BC replicas will pose a threat to the 
protected PDU in the long term.  Copies of the BC will 
not update in the event that privacy and authenticity 
protections on the official BC document and digital 
content are refreshed.    
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4.4. Summary of services 
The binding between the individual and their BC 
is provided by a DNA profile produced using a 
validated DNA profiling protocol.  The genotypes are 
randomly organized and concatenated with additional 
context information to form a PDU that is 
cryptographically hashed.   The CLB issuer digitally 
signs the protected PDU.  The BC issuer will 
incorporate the protected PDU and corresponding CLB 
digital signature within an issued BC. Public-key 
certificates for the CLB and BC issuers will be 
incorporated with BC content in order for the verifier 
to validate the BC’s contents authenticity.  The BC 
issuer will digitally sign across all of the BC’s 
contents.   
 
Figure 1: Depiction of DNA profile generation 
and protection 
 
Figure 2: Depiction of DNA profile verification 
 
At identity verification, BC contents are 
authenticated and the claimant’s DNA profile is 
produced using the same profiling protocol used at 
enrollment.  A claimant version of the protected PDU 
is generated and compared to the enrolled version.  If a 
match does not occur, the claimant is not the same 
person enrolled on the document or a profiling protocol 
error occurred.  If a match occurs, without revealing 
the submitted DNA profile, a verifier’s profiling 
apparatus will produce match probabilities using the 
claimant’s DNA profile and current population 
statistics for use in match significance determination. 
5. Discussion 
The CODIS profile was selected as a potential 
DNA profiling protocol because it has an established 
scientific pedigree on which to base this discussion.  A 
more sensitive identity-profiling protocol could be 
introduced and validated with the same rigor as CODIS 
profiles.  Identifying and the preserving the parental 
origin of the alleles may improve DNA profile 
reliability, but the reference-parent’s privacy, likely the 
birth mother, is at additional risk.  If a substitute 
protocol produces a repeatable sequence of 
discriminating information that undergoes a literal 
value match, the privacy suggestions discussed in this 
paper may apply. 
DNA based document authentication has great 
potential to detect fraudulent claims by genetic 
strangers attempting to impersonate.  Relatives pose a 
comparatively high false positive risk.  Prosecutors 
introduce additional evidence to rule out relatives 
being involved in a crime.  Requiring additional 
documents may not be an option for a verifier because 
the BC may be the only legitimate document available 
for identity verification.  Verifiers can avoid some 
fraud attempts by determining that age and gender of 
the claimant is consistent with what is documented on 
the BC.  Verifiers would need to accept that there is a 
risk of a relative successfully posing as the claimed 
identity. Assuming CODIS profiles are adopted, 
research may be needed to determine how common 
“CODIS twins” (relatives with matching CODIS 
profiles) are within the U.S. population.  This would 
aid in determining the fraud potential posed by 
relatives.    
International adoption of DNA enhanced birth 
records is anticipated to be staggered over time due to 
factors including costs, priorities, societal values and 
logistical complexity.  Traditional visible contents of 
the BC on enhanced BCs can be used by jurisdictions 
not able to validate available DNA enhanced data.  
Those claimants without DNA enhanced birth 
certificates will not be able to provide a higher level of 
identity assurance, but “DNA enhanced” jurisdictions 
will likely rely on the policies they have today for 
accepting and performing identification using foreign 
BCs.  Many nations will want to influence the choice 
of DNA profiling protocol they utilize.  A United 
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Nations organization similar to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) may be the proper 
forum to negotiate details in the areas like DNA 
profiling, PDU structure, contactless storage and 
cryptography.  Each chosen DNA profiling protocol 
will need corresponding statistical analyses of the 
ethnic populations residing in the nations that adopt the 
protocol, which will need to be shared across 
jurisdictions.  International standards and agreements 
will be needed to avoid an overabundance of DNA 
enhancement approaches that would make international 
compatibility costly and technically challenging.   
Failure to verify a legitimate claimant (false 
negative) results from contamination or test execution 
errors.  An authoritative report recommends 
independent re-testing to address false negative 
concerns [1].  The PCR process involves amplifying 
the quantity of alleles at each locus making it highly 
unlikely the alleles are mischaracterized.  This 
precision nearly guarantees that if a true match is 
possible that match will occur.  False negatives using 
PCR-based STR should be expected to be rare using 
properly executed procedures.  Genetic chimerism is 
one of possibly other rare naturally occurring genetic 
conditions that could result in a false negative. 
DNA profiling has the potential to upgrade the 
legitimacy of birth certificates, and improve the 
reliability of documents such as passports, visas, 
school records and license documents.  Missing person 
records could be populated with DNA enhanced birth 
record information drawn from the CLB or BC.  Loved 
ones could find closure from accidents that may have 
significantly damaged human remains.  DNA analysis 
is not novel in these use cases, but to have a reliable, 
comprehensive collection of DNA enhanced birth 
records may improve identification in these situations.  
An open-ended victim identity search with limited 
search constraints will prove to be difficult because of 
the privacy protections on the CLB records, and the 
variation of DNA profiling protocols used historically 
may require several profiles to be generated.  With 
sufficient access, resources and time, the victim’s 
identity could be determined. 
DNA profiles are fundamentally immutable and 
are reusable authenticators.  This combination puts 
pressure on DNA privacy.  Identity thieves need not 
resort to cryptanalysis, but can obtain DNA samples 
that are left behind in daily routines or at times of 
enrollment or verification.  Record level security 
cannot address these threats, but these threats should be 
considered systematically when evaluating DNA 
profiles as a document security feature. 
A 150-year security requirement for protecting a 
historically static low privacy risk record will unsettle 
birth record management.  Adding protected DNA 
profiles will introduce digital authenticity and privacy 
requirements that must be met under threats that will 
span over a century or more for every registered 
person. Cryptanalysis techniques and computational 
power will improve over time.  Public-key certificates 
are commonly set to expire in time periods under a 
century to minimize risk from lost private keys or 
weakened cryptographic algorithms.  One-way 
transformations may leak more original information 
with improved cryptanalysis.  Contactless storage 
device lifetimes will need to be extended or be 
periodically replaced securely. DNA profiling 
protocols will change over time causing support for 
legacy DNA profiles to be burdensome for verifiers.  
These factors challenge the low maintenance tradition 
of birth record management.  It may be necessary for 
CLBs and BCs to undergo a periodic refresh in order to 
utilize an updated DNA profile protocol and improve 
data protections.   A cost benefit analysis performed 
today may show DNA profiling unattractive, but as 
DNA analysis becomes routine, policy-makers should 
not lose sight of the privacy consequences.  Securing 
birth records with DNA profiles appears to be within 
reach, but should be done cautiously. 
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